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Abstract In this paper we experimentally investigate Cournot duopolies with
an extended timing game. The timing game has observable delay, that is, ﬁrms
announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce
in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in the
ﬁrst period. With random matching we ﬁnd that, given the actual experimental
behavior in the subgames, subjects play a timing game more akin to a coordina-
tion game with two symmetric equilibria rather than the predicted game with
a dominant strategy to produce early. As a result, a substantial proportion of
subjects choose the second period.
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1 Introduction
There is substantial interest in the theoretical literature on endogenous timing
in games. This literature started with Saloner (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990), and Robson (1990) and developed into a rich and active research area
in game theory with recent contributions by Henkel (2002), Matsumura (2002),
Normann (2002) and van Damme and Hurkens (2004). The basic question
these models try to answer is simple but signiﬁcant. When are ﬁrms likely to
play either a simultaneous-move game or a sequential-move game? In mod-
els with endogenous sequencing, the order of output or price decisions is not
exogenously speciﬁed. Instead, it is derived from ﬁrms’ decisions in a timing
game.
Several recent experiments have attempted to validate the theory empiri-
cally1 but support for the theory was by and large not found. In these exper-
iments, simultaneous-move Cournot outcomes are modal – in contrast to the
theorywhichpredictsStackelbergequilibriahere.Evenwhensequentialmoves
occur, Stackelberg leaders produce less than predicted while followers produce
more.
Why does theory perform rather poorly in experiments? The theory under-
lying the experiments predicts the emergence of Stackelberg equilibria and
typically there exist two Stackelberg equilibria. This causes two problems. First,
coordination problems occur in the experimental markets since either ﬁrm may
emerge as the Stackelberg leader. Neither Stackelberg equilibrium is prefera-
ble to the other and subjects ﬁnd it difﬁcult to coordinate on one.2 Second, it is
difﬁcult to see from a behavioral perspective why players should coordinate on
an equilibrium with large payoff differences (as it is the case in a Stackelberg
leader–follower outcome). It is well known that subjects in experiments may
exhibit an aversion against disadvantageous inequality (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt
1999). Such inequality aversion might render the Stackelberg equilibria unap-
pealing candidates for convergence in an experiment.
Recent theoretical research, in turn, attempts to rationalize the experimen-
tal data on endogenous timing by allowing players to be inequality averse. Lau
and Leung (2006) analyze the standard Stackelberg duopoly with exogenous
timing when players are inequality averse. They show that a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model is consistent with the experimental
data of Huck, Müller and Normann’s (2001). Santos-Pinto (2006) applies the
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) framework to Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) action
1 Huck et al. (2002) investigate Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) action commitment game. Müller’s
(2005) experiments are on Saloner’s (1987) model, extended by Ellingson (1995). Fonseca et al.
(2005) analyze endogenous timing with asymmetric cost, as modeled by van Damme and Hurkens
(1999). See also Huck et al. (2001) for experiments on exogenously Stackelberg games.
2 Most of the theoretical literature has ignored the coordination problem ﬁrms face in a duopoly
with endogenous timing. An exception are van Damme and Hurkens (1999, 2004) who analyze a
timing game with cost differences between ﬁrms. In their models, a unique Stackelberg equilibrium
with the efﬁcient ﬁrm as the Stackelberg leader is selected. However, Fonseca et al. (2005) still
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commitment game and Saloner’s (1987) timing game. He can rationalize many
but not all aspects of the experimental data of the papers cited in footnote 1. In
particular,inequalityaversioncannotexplaindelayobservedintheexperiments
on Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) action commitment game.
The motivation for this experimental paper is to further explore the rea-
sons for the weak predictive power of standard game theory and the role of
inequality aversion and coordination failure by investigating a timing game
with a unique and symmetric equilibrium. The basis of the experiments is
Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with observable delay in a quan-
tity-setting framework. The equilibrium of this extended timing game is in
simultaneous moves and has equal quantities as ﬁrms have symmetric costs.
At ﬁrst sight, it appears that in these new experiments neither coordination
failure nor inequality aversion should hinder the emergence of the predicted
equilibrium. If symmetric outcomes fueled by inequality aversion and coor-
dination failure have been previously observed even though they were not
predicted,thenitappearsthatthetheoryshouldbevindicatedifsymmetricout-
comes are predicted. However, sequential-move Stackelberg leader–follower
outcomes can still occur in the experiment – if only by mistake. We argue
below that lower proﬁts in the asymmetric timing subgame (possibly due to
inequality aversion) can transform the timing game from one with a unique and
symmetricequilibriumintoacoordinationgamewithtwosymmetricequilibria.
Accordingly, coordination failure and inequality aversion can still play a role
and affect the outcomes in the experiments.
A second novelty is that we run experimental sessions both with randomly
matchedparticipantsaswellaswithparticipantsinﬁxedduopolypairs.Previous
experiments have simulated one-shot interaction (random matching) between
participants since the endogenous timing models are based on static games.
However, repeated interaction is the norm in the ﬁeld. With ﬁxed matching,
the likelihood of collusion is increased and then the timing of duopoly deci-
sions may have an entirely different nature (on which we elaborate in the next
section). Further, ﬁrms should be better able to resolve coordination failure
problems with ﬁxed matching. The reason is that it is more difﬁcult for subjects
to form accurate beliefs about their counterparts’ actions with random match-
ing than with ﬁxed matching. This provides another motivation for analyzing a
treatment with ﬁxed matching as this should, ceteris paribus, lead to a higher
frequency of observations consistent with theory.
It turns out that our results do not thoroughly support the theory, as in
previous studies. Many timing decisions are out of equilibrium as subjects often
delay their output decisions to the second period. For example, in the treat-
ment with random matching, it turns out that Stackelberg leader proﬁts in
the sequential-move subgames are indeed lower than in simultaneous-move
Cournot subgames. That is, given the behavior in the experiments, the tim-
ing game subjects are actually playing is more akin to a coordination game
with two symmetric equilibria rather than a game with a dominant strategy to
produce early. Furthermore, we will argue below that our results are consistent
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often have a preference to delay their decisions even when waiting does not
provide any direct material gain or additional information. In general, our
results suggest that additional forces (next to inequality aversion and coordina-
tion problems) that are not captured in the endogenous timing models might
inﬂuence participants’ decisions.
2 Model and predictions
In Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with observable delay two
ﬁrms can produce in one of two possible periods (period 1 or 2). A pure strat-
egy for ﬁrm i = 1,2 is a choice of a production period ti ∈{ 1,2} and a set of
functions τi : {(1,1),(1,2), (2,1) × R+,(2,2)}→R+ which is ﬁrm i’s quantity
choice as a function of production periods, (t1,t2), and the output of ﬁrm j  = i
whenﬁrmiistheStackelbergfollower.Giventhedecisionstoproduceinperiod
1 or 2, ﬁrms will not randomise over outputs.
In the experiments we used the following linear inverse demand function
p(q1 + q2) = max{30 − (q1 + q2),0} (1)
where qi denotes ﬁrm i’s output. Linear costs of production in both periods
were given by
Ci(qi) = 6qi, i = 1,2. (2)
Proﬁts are denoted by  i = p(q1 + q2)qi − 6qi.
Consider the predictions in the static game ﬁrst. We start with the second
stage. In the subgame with t1 = 1 and t2 = 1, ﬁrms play the simultaneous-move
Cournot equilibrium in period 1 with qi = 8 and resulting in payoffs of  i = 64
(i = 1,2). The same holds in the subgame with t1 = 2 and t2 = 2. In the sub-
game with t1 = 1 and t2 = 2, ﬁrms play the Stackelberg equilibrium with ﬁrm 1
choosing qL
1 = 12 in period 1 whereas ﬁrm 2, the Stackelberg follower, chooses
qF
2 = 6 in period 2. This implies payoffs of  L
1 = 72 and  F
2 = 36. Outputs
and payoffs for the subgame with t1 = 2 and t2 = 1a r eqL
2 = 12,qF
1 = 6 and
 L
2 = 72 and  F
1 = 36. Then we go back to the ﬁrst stage. From  L
i = 72 >
 i = 64 (if tj = 2) and  i = 64 >  F
i = 36 (if tj = 1), choosing period 1 is a
dominant strategy and thus we have t1 = t2 = 1 in the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium.
With repeated interaction in the ﬁxed matching sessions, it is well known
that collusion can occur even though the game is only ﬁnitely repeated (Selten
and Stoecker 1986). It is easy to verify that qi = 6 is the symmetric joint-proﬁt
maximizing strategy which results in payoffs of  i = 72 (i = 1,2). Given both
ﬁrms collude, the timing decisions are immaterial. However, in particular in
the early rounds of the experiment, there may be uncertainty about the other
players’ willingness to collude, and in that case timing decisions may play an
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whether the other player colludes, and at ti = 2 non-colluding rivals may also
be punished. Producing at ti = 1 provides an opportunity to signal collusive
intents. Note that if these incentives for moving ﬁrst or second materialize, they
would be rather different from those in the static endogenous timing models.
Whenplayersareinequalityaverse(e.g.,FehrandSchmidt1999),severalnew
issues come into play. We refer here to the comprehensive studies of Lau and
Leung (2006) and Santos-Pinto (2006) and highlight only a few insights impor-
tant for our setting. Firstly, in the Stackelberg subgames, inequality aversion
will generally cause the follower to produce more than the best reply whenever
qL
i > 8, regardless of the matching scheme. If Stackelberg leaders are playing
against an inequality averse follower but still choose qL
i > 8, this can reduce
the Stackelberg leader proﬁts to be below the proﬁts in the simultaneous-move
Cournot games. (Whether this actually occurs depends on the follower’s output
which, in turn, depends on the degree of inequality aversion). If this is the
case, we have a different prediction for the static game. Choosing period 1 is
no longer a dominant strategy, and the game is transformed into one with two
symmetric timing equilibria (t1 = t2 = 1 and t1 = t2 = 2). Second, inequality
aversion can facilitate collusion. Inequality averse subjects are less inclined to
exploit attempts to cooperate even with random matching,3 so, this generally
gives rise to collusion. Ultimately, this implies that collusion can occur not only
with ﬁxed but also with random matching. However, with random matching,
successful cooperation might still be difﬁcult as subjects cannot be sure about
the type of the player they play against. The timing opportunities may also be
used to facilitate collusion even in the one-shot game (in the same spirit as
outlined above for the repeated game).
3 Experimental design and procedures
Weimplementedtwotreatments:onewithrandomandonewithﬁxedmatching
amongparticipants.Theexperimental marketswererepeatedover30roundsin
order to allow for learning. A minor difference to the game as formally stated
above is that subjects had to choose their quantities from a truncated and
discretized strategy space, yielding a standard payoff bi-matrix. Subjects had to
choose integer quantities between 3 and 15 (see Appendix B).4
In both treatments, subjects got individual feedback about what happened in
their market at theend of each round. That is,the computer screen5 showed the
production period, the quantity, and the proﬁt of both duopolists. In sessions
with random matching (henceforth Random), subjects were rematched by the
computer at the beginning of each round. We conducted ﬁve random-matching
3 As pointed out by an associate editor, collusion can even occur when a perfectly selﬁsh Stackel-
berg leader meets a strongly inequality averse follower. If the ﬁrst mover knows the type of the
follower, we will observe qL
i = 6a n dqF
j = 6.
4 We used the same payoff matrix as in Huck et al. (2001).
5 We used the software toolbox “z-Tree” (Fischbacher 1999).448 M. A. Fonseca et al.
Table 1 Relative frequency
of period 1 choices
Third 1 Third 2 Third 3
Random 57 69 72
Fixed 50 51 53
sessionswithtenparticipantseach.Thetwosessionswithﬁxedmatching(hence-
forth Fixed) had ten participants as well, so there were ﬁve ﬁxed duopoly pairs
in each session. Treatments were conducted in an identical way, except for the
matching scheme.
The experiments were conducted at Royal Holloway College, University of
London, in spring and summer 2002. Altogether 70 subjects participated in the
experiment. They were students from various departments, many from ﬁelds
other than economics or business administration.
In the instructions (see Appendix A) subjects were told that they would
act as a ﬁrm which, together with another ﬁrm serves a market for 30 rounds,
and that in each round both were to choose when and how much to produce.
After having read the instructions, participants could privately ask questions.
Before the ﬁrst round was started subjects were asked to answer two control
questions (which were checked) in order to make sure that everybody had full
understanding of the payoff table.
The monetary payment was computed by using an exchange rate of 300
“points” for £1 and adding a ﬂat payment of £4.6 Subjects’ average earnings
were £13.02 ($19.53 at the time) including the ﬂat payment. The sessions lasted
about 60 to 90 min.
4 Experimental results
We report the results of treatments Random and Fixed separately. When
discussing the results, we often refer to third 1 (rounds 1–10), third 2 (rounds
11–20), and third 3 (last ten rounds).
4.1 Random matching
Table1showstheevolutionoftherelativefrequencyoft=1choicesovertime.In
Random the relative frequency of t=1 decisions increases from 57 to 72% (from
third 1 to third 3). This is a clear trend towards equilibrium timing behavior.
However, the relative frequency of t = 1 choices is still below the equilibrium
prediction of 100% towards the end of the experiment. Moreover the increase
slows down considerably from third 2 to third 3.
6 This payment was made since subjects could have made losses in the game.Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence 449
Table 2 Average individual quantities in the subgames over time
Third 1 Third 2 Third 3
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Random t = 1 9.0, 9.0 10.6, 7.8 9.0, 9.0 10.3, 8.9 8.7, 8.7 9.3, 9.0
t = 2 8.3, 8.3 9.1, 9.1 8.5, 8.5
Fixed t = 1 9.0, 9.0 9.2, 8.4 9.4, 9.4 9.0, 8.0 9.7, 9.7 8.5, 7.7
t = 2 9.0, 9.0 9.2, 9.2 7.6, 7.6
Since we have random matching, the relative frequency of timing decisions
immediately implies the relative frequencies of the timing outcomes. The equi-
librium prediction with both ﬁrms choosing t = 1, occurs with only 55% (third
3). Simultaneous play in t = 2 occurs with 10% and sequential play with the
remaining 35% (third 3). Since t = 1 choices increase over time, the relative
frequency of the subgame where both ﬁrms choose t = 1 increases whereas the
frequency of the other two subgames decreases.
Once ﬁrms have made their timing choices, they know in which sequence
theychoosetheiroutputs.Howdoﬁrmsbehaveinthesubgames?Table2shows
average individual quantities across time contingent on the timing decisions.7
In Random , we observe that after a short learning phase (third 1), quantity
choices in the t1 = t2 = 1 and t1 = t2 = 2 subgames are almost identical and move
towards the Cournot prediction.
However,intheasymmetricsubgame,attemptstoexploitaﬁrstmoveradvan-
tage by choosing a higher than Cournot quantity of 8 is punished by followers.
Note, for instance, that the best response to a ﬁrst mover’s quantity of 10 and 9
is7and8respectively.8 Moreover,ﬁrstmovers’outputissmallerthanpredicted
(12 units). As a consequence, both Stackelberg leaders’ and followers’ payoffs
are smaller than the payoffs in the two simultaneous subgames, as shown in
Table 3.9
In fact, in the last two thirds the payoffs in the two simultaneous-move
subgames are almost the same and higher than in the sequential-move
subgame. This has two effects. First, it provides an incentive for the subjects
to avoid the sequential-move subgame by choosing the ﬁrst production period
t = 1 more often (which also avoids to get into the disadvantageous position
of a Stackelberg follower). This might explain why we see a clear increase in
t =1choicesduringtheﬁrsttwothirds.Second,thefactthatovertimepayoffsin
7 Since the two players in the game are symmetric there are two, albeit identical subgames where
one player moves ﬁrst and the other delays. However, that same symmetry allows for the aggrega-
tion of the data as if it was only one subgame. We then omit the lower left-hand corner cell in all
matrices in Tables 2 and 3.
8 Note that followers can cheaply punish leaders for over-producing. Consider the case where a
leader sets an output of 10, as is the case on average for the early part of the experiment. A follower
by selecting an output level 1 unit higher than the best reply foregoes 1 unit of proﬁt but this costs
the Stackelberg leader 10 units of proﬁt.
9 Signiﬁcant at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, where each observation corre-
sponds to the average proﬁts across players from a session.450 M. A. Fonseca et al.
Table 3 Average individual proﬁts in the subgames over time
Third 1 Third 2 Third 3
t = 1 t = 2 t = 2 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Random t = 1 49.8, 49.8 53.9, 40.2 49.8, 49.8 43.7, 37.2 56.2, 56.2 48.7, 46.3
t = 2 58.0, 58.0 50.1, 50.1 55.9, 55.9
Fixed t = 1 47.3, 47.3 52.6, 49.3 43.6, 43.6 55.9, 54.2 41.0, 41.0 64.5, 58.4
t = 2 49.7, 49.7 43.2, 43.2 61.9, 61.9
the two simultaneous-move subgames become similar (and higher than in the
sequential-movesubgame)turnsthetiminggameintoacoordinationgamewith
two strict symmetric equilibria. This provides one reason why the convergence
to t = 1 choices is not complete.
Nevertheless,overallwenotethatsubjectschoosingperiod1earnonaverage
higher payoffs over time than subjects choosing period 2.10 The proﬁt ﬁgures
are 51.6 and 47.3 (third 1), 48.9 and 41.6 (third 2), and 54.4 and 49.9 (third 3)
for t = 1 and t = 2 choices, respectively.
Note also that, over time, Stackelberg leaders become less competitive
and Stackelberg followers appear to move towards matching the Stackelberg
leader’s quantity such that payoff differences become less extreme. This means
that the incentive to avoid the sequential-move game gets weaker which is
another reason why we see a slowdown in the convergence to t = 1 choices
during the last two thirds.
It is instructive to compare these results to those reported in Huck
et al. (2002) (henceforth HMN). Their experimental design is identical to ours
but the one major difference is the timing game. HMN used Hamilton and
Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with action commitment. In this game, a ﬁrm
can move ﬁrst only by committing to an output. When doing so, the ﬁrm does
notknowwhatitscompetitorisdoing.Bywaitinguntilthesecondperiod,aﬁrm
can observe the other ﬁrm’s ﬁrst period action. Theory predicts the emergence
of Stackelberg equilibria. More precisely, there exist two Stackelberg equilib-
ria and one ﬁrst period Cournot equilibrium, but only the two Stackelberg
equilibria are in undominated strategies.
The surprising insight from the comparison of our data to those of HMN is
that results differ only marginally – even though predictions based on subgame
perfectnessopposeeachother.InHMN,therelativefrequencyoft =1decisions
is 56, 65 and 62% across thirds. These numbers are very close to ours in the ﬁrst
two thirds and only somewhat smaller towards the end of the experiment. Note
thatinourexperimentﬁrmshaveastrictincentivetochooset =1(theycanonly
lose by choosing t = 2) while, in the extended game with action commitment,
ﬁrms have a weak incentive to delay (as they can play a best reply to whatever
therivalﬁrmdidint=1).Nevertheless,aggregatet =1choicesarerathersimilar
in both studies.
10 This is, however, not signiﬁcantly different at any conventional level of signiﬁcance (two-tailed
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The similarity of market outcomes in both experiments is also illustrated
by a look at the frequency of Cournot outcomes (that is, both ﬁrms choosing
quantity 8, regardless of the timing decisions). In Random we ﬁnd 16.0% and
in HMN 14.4% Cournot outcomes. This is in contrast to the prediction that we
should observe Cournot outcomes only in Random but not in HMN.
Another telling statistic is the ratio of market shares. We calculate the num-
bers := max{q1,q2}/min{q1,q2}foreachindividualmarketandforeachround.
TheaveragesforthemarketsinHMNis1.27(standarddeviation0.36)and1.33
(standard deviation 0.48) in Random. Thus, the ratio of market shares in the
current study (in which symmetric Cournot outcomes are predicted) is higher
than in the previous experiment where asymmetric Stackelberg outcomes are
predicted.
4.2 Fixed matching
Let us now consider treatment Fixed. Table 1 above also shows the evolution
of the relative frequency of t=1 choices in Fixed. In contrast to Random, period
one choices stay roughly constant at a level of 50%. The frequency of timing
outcomes is not immediate from Table 1 as they depend on individual duopoly
pairs. We ﬁnd that the frequency of the predicted t1 = t2 = 1 subgame increases
from 17 to 32% (from third 1 to third 3). Surprisingly, the frequency of the
t1=t2=2 subgame increases, too, from 17 to 26%. As in treatment Random,t h e
frequency of the sequential subgame decreases from 66 to 42% but it is modal
in all thirds.
Table 2 reports average quantities. With the exception of the t = 1 Cour-
not subgame, outputs are generally smaller compared to Random, indicating a
tendency to collude. We note that output produced in the ﬁrst period simulta-
neous subgame is always slightly higher than the Cournot quantity of 8. Whilst
the Cournot output in t = 1 appears to be larger in Fixed,11 we observe that
average outputs in the sequential subgame is smaller in the Fixed treatment.
In fact, both Stackelberg leaders and followers in treatment Fixed are less
competitive than those in treatment Random12 (although, on average, Stackel-
berg leaders and followers in Fixed do not collude perfectly at the joint-proﬁt
maximum). This implies that in treatment Fixed there is less of an incentive to
avoid the sequential subgame by choosing t = 1.13
11 This difference is not signiﬁcant (one-tailed Mann–Whitney U test).
12 This is signiﬁcant at the 1% level regarding the Stackelberg followers, but not regarding the
Stackelberg leaders (one-tailed Mann–Whitney U test).
13 A look at Table 3 suggests that actual behavior in the subgames turns the timing game into one
with two asymmetric equilibria. However, we have ﬁxed matching here and indeed we ﬁnd strong
cohort effects. It appears that timing choices are often used to coordinate on a collusive outcome.
Therefore, the payoff differences between subgames should not be interpreted as an indication that
some subgame should be played more often. Depending on the group, different timing choices may
lead to proﬁts rather different from those in Table 3.452 M. A. Fonseca et al.
As expected from the lower quantities, proﬁts are usually higher in Fixed.
More precisely, average proﬁts after choosing period 1 and period 2, respec-
tively, are 50.8 and 49.4 (third1), 50.1 and 49.3 (third2), and 50.3 and 60.3 (third
3), respectively. Hence, timing decisions do not seem to affect proﬁts very much
in the ﬁrst two thirds but towards the end of the experiment subjects seem to
coordinate more effectively in the t1 = t2 = 2 subgame. As mentioned above,
one reason why output choices become more collusive when both subjects in
treatment Fixed choose to produce in period t = 2, is that this choice might
signaltheintentionnottotrytoexploittheothersubjectasaStackelbergleader.
This might then gain the trust of the other subject and allows the two subjects
to collude. The fact that the frequency of both simultaneous-move subgames
rises over time can by and large be explained by observing that some pairs tend
to coordinate on t = 1 whereas others tend to coordinate on t = 2. Recall that
production costs are the same in both periods.
5 Discussion
Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) extended game with observable delay has a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players choose to produce
in the ﬁrst period, implying symmetric Cournot quantities. In this paper we
report on an experimental test of this prediction. We run the game both with
a random and a ﬁxed matching scheme. With random-matching, we ﬁnd that
subjects choose the predicted production period more frequently over time but
choices do not converge to the predicted level as nearly one third of all subjects
still chooses to delay toward the end of the experiment. With a ﬁxed-match-
ing scheme we ﬁnd that the subgame perfect equilibrium has no predictive
power with regard to timing choices as throughout the experiment only half
of the timing observations are period one choices. The differences in timing
choices in the two treatments can to some extent be explained by the deviations
fromthepredictionobservedinthesequential-movesubgame.Inthetreatment
with random matching, more competitive behavior in the Stackelberg subgame
provides an incentive to avoid it by choosing to produce early. This is not the
case in the treatment with ﬁxed matching as here the behavior in the sequen-
tial-move subgame is less competitive.
The ﬁnding that timing choices in the main treatment with random matching
do not converge to the predicted level might be explained by several obser-
vations. First, we noted that given subjects’ behavior in the subgames, after
some experience the timing game more resembles a coordination game with
two symmetric equilibria. Thus, as both players choosing either period one or
period two become equilibrium choices, it is apprehensible that convergence
to equilibrium slows down and remains incomplete. Furthermore, over time
subjects’ behavior in the asymmetric subgame becomes less competitive which
reduces the incentive to avoid it and, thus, slows down the convergence towards
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A second observation is that there might be preferences that cause subjects
to delay their decisions. This is supported by answers given in the post-exper-
imental questionnaire. Some subjects state there that waiting until period two
would allow them to react to the other player’s ﬁrst period output (if applica-
ble).14 This propensity to postpone decisions seems to also exist in the realm
of individual decision making. Tykocinski and Rufﬂe (2003) documented such
preferences in their study about “reasonable reasons for waiting”. They show
that subjects often prefer to delay their decisions even when waiting does not
provide any additional information. Our results indicate that subjects some-
times prefer to wait even when doing so puts them at a strategic disadvantage.
When choosing period two, our subjects can ﬁnd out which action the rival
ﬁrm has chosen, provided this rival chose the ﬁrst period. Even though they
become the Stackelberg follower in this case, they prefer to wait, perhaps to
resolve the strategic uncertainty about the other player’s action. Once subjects
are more familiar with the experimental environment, this preference to wait is
getting weaker in the random-matching treatment. Nevertheless many subjects
still delay towards the end of the experiment.
With ﬁxed matching, these considerations may be less relevant since sub-
jects face less ambiguity regarding choices of their opponent. As argued above,
timing choices may not reﬂect the incentives suggested by non-cooperative
game theory. Instead, timing choices may turn out to be an instrument to
support collusion. While we observe only little collusion in our experiments,
our results suggest that timing decisions do not affect proﬁts by very much with
ﬁxed matching (except towards the end of the experiment).
Wefoundthatourresultswithrandommatchingaresimilarinmanyrespects
to those in Huck et al. (2002) although Stackelberg equilibria are predicted for
those experiments. Generally, previous work15 found that endogenous timing
models predicting asymmetric outcomes are of limited behavioral relevance
due to coordination failure and inequality aversion. The results in this study
show that there are forces sufﬁciently strong to prevent play from converging
to a unique equilibrium of an endogenous timing model even if the equilibrium
is symmetric.
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Appendix A: Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not
talk to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you have
any questions, please give us a sign. We will answer your question privately.
In our experiment you can earn different amounts of money, depending on
your behavior and that of other participants matched with you. All participants
read identical instructions.
You have the role of a ﬁrm which produces the same product as a second
ﬁrm in the market. First you have to decide, at which time you want to produce.
Afterwards, you decide on the quantity you want to produce.
Regarding the time when to produce, you can choose either the ﬁrst or the
second production period. As the other ﬁrm has the same choice, there are four
possibilities. Both ﬁrst, both second, you ﬁrst and the other ﬁrm second, and
you second and the other ﬁrm ﬁrst. In all cases, you will be informed about the
timing decision of the other ﬁrm before choosing your quantity.
The quantity decisions are made in the sequence resulting from the timing
decisions. If both ﬁrms choose ﬁrst or both choose second, quantity decisions
are made simultaneously. In those cases, you and the other ﬁrm have to make
the quantity decisions not knowing what the other one chooses. If you choose
ﬁrst and the other ﬁrm second, then the other ﬁrm will learn your quantity
decision before making its own decision. Likewise, if you choose second and
the other ﬁrm ﬁrst, then you will learn the other ﬁrm’s output decision before
making your own decision.
Note that the proﬁt in each round depends only on the chosen quantities, not
on the choice of production periods. In the attached payoff table, you can see
the resulting proﬁts of both ﬁrms for all possible choices of quantity. The table
reads as follows: At the head of a row the quantity of your ﬁrm is indicated, at
the head of a column the quantity of the other ﬁrm is stated. In the cell at which
row and column intersect, your proﬁt is noted in the lower left and the other
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is stated in the upper right. All proﬁts are expressed in a ﬁctional
currency, which we call “Points”.
Theexperimentlasts30rounds.Aftereachround,youwillbeinformedabout
the quantity choice of the other ﬁrm, your proﬁt and the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
You do not know with which participant you serve the market. You will be
randomly matched with a participant each round. This random move is done
by the computer.
Anonymity is kept among participants and instructors, as your decisions will
onlybeidentiﬁedwithacodenumber.Youwilldiscreetlyreceiveyourpayment
at the end of the experiment.
Concerning the payment note the following. At the end of the experiment,
your earnings in Points determine your payment in pounds sterling. For every
300 Points you will receive 1£. In addition to this payment, you will receive the
show-up fee of 4£ independently of your earnings during the 30 rounds.Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence 455
Appendix B: Payoff table



















































































































































































































































































































































The head of the row represents one ﬁrm’s quantity and the head of the column represents the
quantity of the other ﬁrm. Inside the box at which row and column intersect, one ﬁrm’s proﬁt
matching this combination of quantities stands up to the left and the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt stands down
to the right. Fourteen entries were manipulated in order to get unique best replies (see Huck et al.
2001)
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